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i Abstract 
This paper investigates energy market integration in China by employing 
univariate, and panel-based unit root tests and Granger causality tests applied to a new 
energy price data set. We identify price series that converge either to absolute or relative 
price parity. In addition we estimate the rates (speed) at which relative prices converge to 
their long-run values, and the direction of causality. The results show that gasoline and diesel 
markets are very well integrated as a whole; and that once some geographically isolated 
regions are excluded, we can regard the coal market as integrated; however, the electricity 
market is not well integrated. The estimated intercept terms are all very small and close to 
zero, such that most of the relative price series can be regarded as convergent to absolute 
price parity. The convergence rates vary little and are relatively short when compared 
internationally. A rich set of causal relationships are established many showing bi-directional 
causality between regional centres. 
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1  Introduction 
The ongoing transition of former communist countries from planned to market economies 
has been one of the most important economic phenomena in the last few decades. It is interesting, 
therefore, to consider whether the liberalisation of domestic trade prompts major shifts in price structures 
that were highly distorted under central planning (Fan and Wei, 2006). Such a study is interesting because 
of the ongoing debate as to whether China’s gradualist reform has been successful (see Lau, Qian and 
Roland, 2000; Young, 2000; Poncet, 2003 and 2005). Since China embarked on its economic reform and 
adopted an open door policy in the late 1970s, its economic development has been greatly enhanced by 
active participation in international trade. However, recently there has been more debate about domestic 
trade, and China’s major trading partners have strongly urged it to further open its domestic market, 
especially since it was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, even if the Chinese 
government removes the barriers to international trade, the effectiveness of this policy might be 
compromised by regional trade barriers within China itself (Fan and Wei, 2006). It is thus useful to test 
whether domestic markets are integrated, which can then provide some important information on how 
the market works in China (Zhou, Wan and Chen, 2000). Such information may help the government 
decide on the extent to which it should intervene in the market (Wyeth, 1992) and how. 
Oil prices have been extensively analysed in the literature over the past three decades (Lanza, 
Manera and Giovannini, 2005). Many applied research and policy studies have examined the role of oil 
prices in determining economic growth or inflation rates both in developed and developing countries 
(Adrangi et al., 2001; Asche et al., 2003; Stern, 2000; Girma and Paulson, 1999; Gjolberg and Johnsen, 
1999; Serletis, 1994; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). Energy market integration has also been extensively 
investigated1. Recent work, however, reveals only one study, Fan and Wei (2006), which reports results for 
China. Fan and Wei (2006) test for The Law of One Price using 72 time series: 41 industrial products, 20 
agricultural products, 13 other consumer goods and 18 service products. However, their study includes 
only two fuel variables (gasoline and diesel), which one might expect, a priori, to be the most likely to 
show market integration among the key energy inputs. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
specific study on energy market integration using data from China, which also considers two other key 
fuels, coal and electricity. Therefore, this study makes two contributions.  Firstly, we investigate energy 
price movements using a new, high frequency, data set that contains market prices for four energy types 
(coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel) from 31 cities (all of which are provincial or autonomous regions and 
 
1 see for example, Asche, Osmundsen and Tveteras, (2002); Asche, Osmunddsen and Sandssmark, (2006); 
Bachmeier and Griffin, (2006); De Vany and Walls, (1999); Narayan and Smyth, (2005); Adrangi et al., (2001); Asche, 
Gjolberg and Volker, (2003); Gjolberg and Johnsen, (1999); Serletis, (1994) and Weiner, (1991) municipal cities) collected at 10-day intervals over a maximum of 132 months (from 1995 to 2005).  
Secondly, we provide results for two key energy input prices, coal and electricity, whose price convergence 
has not yet been reported for China.   
This paper has four major goals. The first is to investigate energy market integration across 
major cities in China; the second is to test whether energy prices converge to absolute or relative price 
parity; the third is to estimate the rate at which relative prices converge to their long-run values across 
cities, and the fourth is to identify causal relationships across cities to observe how price information 
flows between cities. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
methodologies used, followed in Section 3 by a description of the new dataset utilised in the study. Section 
4 presents the results and provides main findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Methodologies 
A common approach used to investigate market integration is to apply unit root tests to 
examine whether price differentials are stationary (see for example, Bernard and Durlauf 1996 and 
Greasley and Oxley, 1997). Rejection of the unit root hypothesis implies that the time series of relative 
prices are stationary, such that relative prices will converge in the long run. Otherwise, if the tests fail to 
reject the null hypothesis, the relative price series will follow a random walk (Fan and Wei, 2006). 
The first stage of the time series based tests of price convergence utilises some form of unit 
root test, for example the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In our particular example we are 
interested in testing for integration of the relevant energy market across the major Chinese cities, by 
testing for price convergence. Tests that suggest the relative price series [ ] are 
stationary will provide some evidence of convergence, either absolute or relative. The unit root-based tests 
utilise a regression of the form: 
) / ln( . , t j t ij ijt g g p =
                             (1)  ∑ + Δ + + = Δ − −
k
h
t ij h t ij ijh t ij ij ij t ij p p c p , , 1 , , ε β α
Where   is the first-difference operator;  ,  Δ c α  and β are the parameters to be estimated;ε  
is an identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) error term; i, j and t refer respectively to city (i), energy 
product (j) and time (t). The ADF unit root test is simply the test of whether  ij α  is negative and 
statistically significant. The number of lags, k, to be included in equation (1) for each product and city 
series is determined individually using the modified Hannan-Quinn criterion on a city-by-city and product-
by-product basis. 
  2All the ADF specifications include an intercept term to capture city-specific fixed effects and a 
time trend. Such intercept effects may cover, for instance, city-specific transportation, income levels, and 
local non-traded costs. The inclusion of the intercept term is also used to test whether prices converge to 
absolute price parity (zero mean) or relative price parity (non-zero mean) (Fan and Wei, 2006). 
It is convenient to use one city as a benchmark ( ) in order to generate relative price series 
and conduct the ADF unit root tests
jt g
2. Theoretically, it is possible that all of the ADF unit root tests will 
reject the null hypothesis no matter which city is chosen as a benchmark ( ) if the energy market is 
completely integrated. However, there may be apparent differences across energy products in the degree 
of market integration. Therefore, we firstly conduct the ADF unit root tests using one city as a benchmark 
to see how many tests reject the null. If the ADF unit root tests show almost all of them reject the unit 
root hypothesis for some energy products, it may not be necessary to further conduct the ADF unit root 
tests of relative price series on city-by-city basis. However, it may be more likely that the second scenario 
holds and most of the ADF unit root tests do not reject the null hypothesis. In this case, it can be argued 
that one city (or regional market) is not integrated with the benchmark city (or region), but it does not 
mean this city (or regional market) is not integrated with other cities (or regional markets). Therefore, we 
will conduct the ADF unit root tests on a city-by-city basis. This suggests that the markets of some 
products may not be integrated nationally, but can be integrated regionally due to, for example, 
transportation costs or network connections (especially for power supply markets). The city-by-city ADF 
unit root tests may also provide some clues as to where the regional market is located and which cities are 
included. If there are regional markets for coal and electricity, as the city-by-city ADF unit root tests 
suggest, we conduct panel data unit root tests for those groups of cities.   
jt g
It is also interesting to measure the rate at which the relative price series converge to their 
long-run values. Ceglowski (2003) discusses the rates of convergence and their ‘half-lives’ using the 
expression, ) 1 ln( / ) 5 . 0 ln( ij α + , where  ij α is a parameter to be estimated in equation (1). Since, in our 
case, the energy spot price data used are recorded every 10-days, the final half-lives are expressed in 
months by dividing the expression by 3. 
Furthermore, it is also interesting to establish the direction of flows of information, embodied 
in prices, between energy markets and by implication, test for Granger causality. The following regression 
is used in this instance: 
                                                           
2 We also consider and report some results where we benchmark against an average of all the city prices. 
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The causality tests can be undertaken with the following null hypotheses: 
   0 1 2 21 = = = = γ θ θ n L                                                     (4) 
Which implies there is no causality from  to .  j p i p
   0 2 4 41 = = = = γ θ θ n L                                                     (5) 
Which implies there is no causality from   to  .  i p j p
3  Data 
The data used in this empirical study are a panel data set of 10-day prices for four energy fuels 
in 31 major Chinese cities.3 The price data are collected by the China Price Information Center (CPIC) – a 
division of the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) of the People’s Republic of China. The 
data used in this study are spot prices and are regularly collected on a ten-day interval (the 5th, 15th and 25th 
of each month) from local markets by governmental agencies.4 
Unlike other market price data, our fuel price data have no missing data during the study 
period as fuels are extensively used in all cities. We use four major fuel products: coal, electricity, gasoline 
and diesel. These panel data are truly nationally representative because they cover the main fuel 
components, all provincial capital cities of mainland China, and the period 1995 to 2005. This is to be 
contrasted with most other empirical studies, which use a price index of lower frequency (such as annual) 
                                                           
3  The cities are Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Huhehaote, Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Hangzhou, Hefei, Fuzhou, Nanchang, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou, Nanning, 
Haikou, Chongqing, Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming, Lhasa, Xian, Lanzhou, Xining, Yinchuan, Urumqi. They include 
four municipalities and all the capital cities for the 31 provinces and autonomous regions in mainland China. 
4 The price data are collected to provide price information to the central and local governments for macroeconomic 
management. According to state law, the local price bureaus in 31 major cities are obligated to report price 
information for a specified list of products to the Price Information Center. The price information must be collected 
from fixed local markets. The fuel price information is collected three times a month, on the 5th, the 15th and the 25th 
day of the month. The fuel names are uniform across all cities, and all prices must be market prices. 
  4data. The 10-day frequency of our price data also corresponds well to the time needed for domestic price 
arbitrage. A lower frequency (monthly) price data are not as useful when we wish to test for price 
convergence with any degree of precision (Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, monthly spot prices are not as rich 
a data source as 10-day spot prices, particularly if one wants to measure the half-life of subsequent 
adjustment following the shorter time response (Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006). 
The quality of Chinese data is often criticised as reporting in China is often affected by 
political factors (Rawski, 2001). However, we believe that the data for specific product prices collected by 
local government agencies under strict government mandates are unlikely to be subject to manipulation. 
Central government requires the collection of prices for specific products at fixed dates and locations and 
these price data are also available to the public so that local officials would find it hard to report false data. 
Unlike macro-economic data (such as GDP growth and employment rates), these micro data for prices 
could hardly serve as indicators when assessing the performance of local officials and hence local officials 
have little incentive to falsify them. 
4  Results and discussions 
The methodology used here commences with unit root tests on the raw price data. The 
individual unit root test results are displayed in Appendix 1 for the individual city levels data series and 
Appendix 2 for the first differenced series. In summary the unit root tests show that each of the 31 city 
price data series for all four energy products exhibit unit roots.  All the tests suggest that the first 
differences of the series are stationary and therefore that all series are integrated of order 1 or I(1). 
4.1  Shanghai benchmark 
Having established that the raw price series each contain a unit root, we next conduct the 
ADF unit root test for relative price series using Shanghai as a benchmark to examine whether energy 
prices of all other cities converge with that of Shanghai. The test results are shown in table 1.  
Table 1 shows that for coal, 9 of the 31 relative price series are significant at the 5% level 
which means that few of the city price series show convergence in the case of coal. For electricity, there 
are only two relative price series that reject the null hypothesis and indicate convergence. However, for 
gasoline and diesel the opposite is true. Here, all but six (Tianjin, Hangzhou, Nanning, Changsha [noted 
still at the 5.6% level], Chongqing, and Lhasa) of the ADF unit root tests show rejection at above 5% level 
for the gasoline relative price series. Likewise, almost the same is observed for diesel. In particular, there 
are 19 relative price series that reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level, accounting for approximately 
60% of the total of 31 diesel relative series. In addition, there are three relative price series that reject the 
  5null hypothesis close to the 5% level (Jinan, Nanning and Chengdu) and four at the 10% level 
(Shijiazhuang, Huhehaote, Hangzhou and Urumqi). This means all but four (Hefei, Guangzhou, Kunming 
and Lhasa) of the ADF unit root tests show rejection at above 10% level for diesel.  
At this stage we can see that gasoline and diesel prices show strong convergence with 
Shanghai. If we take account of some special and remote regions (e.g., Lhasa, Urumqi, Kunming), almost 
all gasoline and diesel prices series are convergent with each other. Therefore, we are able to conclude that 
the gasoline and diesel markets in China are integrated. This finding is generally consistent with that in 
Fan and Wei (2006), the only difference is that this study shows observed prices of more cities to be 
convergent, which may be due to the unique features of the data we utilise.   
However, for the coal and electricity markets we cannot conclude that they are nationally 
integrated because only some (for coal) and a few (for electricity) pairs of relative price series demonstrate 
convergence. Moreover, we are unable to identify the reasons either due to commodity-specific 
characteristics (e.g., volume and network connection) or due to human intervention (e.g., local or regional 
trade barriers and central priority policies for some special cities or specific economic zones, such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, etc). However, there may be some regionally integrated markets for coal and 
electricity because it is possible for those insignificant series to be convergent with those of its neighbours 
instead of convergent with Shanghai. In effect, we may have ‘local convergence’ akin to the ‘convergence 
clubs’ found in the macroeconomic literature. To test for the possible existence of local convergence we 
extend the research in two important ways. Firstly, we apply the same unit root testing procedure on a 
‘city-by-city’ basis to test whether there are regional markets for coal and electricity. These city-by-city unit 
root test results are presented as table 2 for coal and table 3 for electricity. Secondly, we undertake panel-
based unit root tests on a group of cities using an average of a group of city prices as a benchmark to test 
whether the group of cities identified above as convergent, are regionally integrated. These results are 
presented as table 4. 
4.2  City-by-city convergence 
Firstly, consider the city-by-city results presented as table 2, which show that there are 65 pairs 
of relative price series that reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (non-convergence) at the 5% level, 
accounting for 14% of total (465) pairs of relative price series.5 In particular, there are 12-13 pairs of 
relative price series that reject the null hypothesis for Shijiazhuang (code 3), Nanning (code 20) and 
Chongqing (code 22). There are 7-10 pairs of relative price series that reject the null hypothesis for five 
                                                           
5 In this study, we choose significance at the 5% level.  At the 10% level there are 111 pairs of relative price series 
which reject the null hypothesis, accounting for 24% of the total of (465) pairs. 
  6cities, which are Beijing (code 1), Huhehaote (code 5), Shanghai (code 9), Wuhan (code 17), Chengdu 
(code 23) and Xian (code 27).  
  It is interesting to note that the coal price in Taiyuan (code 4), which is located in Shanxi 
province, the largest coal production base and accounting for approximate 20% of national coal supply, is 
not significantly convergent6 with the coal price of its neighbors, Huhehaote (code 5), which is located in 
Inner Mongolia autonomous region, the second or third largest coal production area and accounting for 
about 10% of the national supply of coal. This suggests that the coal price in Taiyuan is not convergent 
with the coal price in the production area. However, for Huhehaote it seems the opposite holds as its coal 
price is convergent with that of most of its neighbors (Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan and Changchun) and south 
towards Jinan, Wuhan, Changsha and Shanghai. 
  If we consider columns 3, 20 and 22 in more detail, we are able to identify regional energy 
markets and their locations. For example, the first starts from Shijiazhuang (code 3), which converges with 
those of its neighbors: Beijing (code 1), Huhehaote (code 5), Shenyang (code 6) and Zhengzhou (code 16). 
It extends southeast to Hefei (code 12) and Shanghai (code 9), and southwest to Xian (code 27) and 
Wuhan (code 17) and might extend further to the west to include Chongqing (code 22) and Chengdu 
(code 23). It therefore covers approximately eleven cities and is geographically located in north, central 
and central west China. Its track is generally from northeast to southwest and ‘bends’ to the southeast. 
Also following convergent lines, Nanning (code 20) and Chongqing (code 22), comprise the second coal 
market beginning at the east coast, Shanghai (code 9) and Hangzhou (code 11), moving west first towards 
Hefei (12) and Nanchang (code 14), then towards Wuhan (code 17) and Changsha (code 18). From there 
it moves further west to Chongqing (code 22), Chengdu (code 23) and Xian (code 27) and south towards 
Nanning (code 20) and Guangdong (code 19). This area covers eleven cities, which are located in the 
central west, central south, central east and south of China.7 The general shape looks like a triangle, the 
top angle is located in Shanghai and Zhejiang, two bottom angles are located in southwest (Sichuan and 
Chongqing) and south (Guangxi and Guangdong). 
  Moving to the results on electricity presented as table 3, there appear to be fewer examples of 
convergence. In particular, there are 38 pairs which reject the null hypothesis, which account for 8.2% of 
the total (465) pairs of relative price series. There are only four cities; Nanchang (code 14), Zhengzhou 
(code 16), Haikou (21) and Lhasa (26) that have 8-10 pairs of relative price series which reject the null at 
the 5% level. In addition, fewer pairs of relative price series can be found to be convergent in the major 
                                                           
6 Because their p-value is 5.7% and insignificant based on the criterion used in this study. 
7 It should be noted that some cities may be included in different markets. 
  7cities. For example, none of the pairs identified reject the null for Beijing (code 1) and Guangzhou (code 
19). One pair rejects the null for Nanjing (code 10) and Hangzhou (code 11). Two pairs reject the null for 
Shanghai (code 9) and Jinan (code 14). Therefore, it seems less likely that the electricity market can be 
described as ‘regionally integrated’ as was argued above for coal. However, we found that there are 111 
pairs which reject the null hypothesis if the level of significance is raised to the 10% level, accounting for 
24% of the total of 465 pairs in the relative price series. We also found that annual standard deviation 
coefficients have fallen since 1995: 29.3% in 1995, 25.6% in 2000 and only 8.9% in 2005.8 
  In sum, based upon the city-by-city unit root tests we cannot conclude that the coal and 
electricity markets are nationally integrated although we have found some evidence of ‘within region’ 
convergence.  
4.3  Panel unit root tests of convergence 
Next, we use panel unit root tests which are less likely to suffer from multiple testing issues 
and size distortion. Such tests are known to have greater power (Banerjee, 1999; Maddala and Wu, 1999). 
Therefore, to test whether a group of cities belong to a certain regional market, we use panel-based unit 
root tests as an alternative to the city-by-city approach. We conduct two types of panel-based unit root 
tests. One is for the group of cities that were previously identified as belonging to the same coal regional 
market. Another is for the group of all cities for electricity, gasoline and diesel markets to demonstrate 
that the electricity market is not nationally integrated and the oil markets are nationally integrated as 
discussed previously. 
From table 4, first we are able to conclude that both the coal regional market I and II 
identified in the last section show convergence. Second, although two coal regional markets are identified, 
they are very close geographically and partly merge together, which may imply that both of them are also 
integrated and belong to a greater regional market. We can conclude, based on table 4, that both of the 
coal regional markets actually belong to the same greater market, there defined as market III. In this case, 
if we ignore the remote cities (due to transportation cost) and small regional economies which are much 
less likely to consume large volumes of coal, most of the cities in China might be regarded as belonging to 
one integrated coal market as most appear to ‘converge’ to each other via a network of adjacent prices. 
Third, the groups of all cities for gasoline and diesel prices also show convergence, which further confirms 
our conclusion that both the gasoline and diesel markets are nationally integrated in China. Finally, as for a 
                                                           
∑
8 Annual standard deviation coefficients are calculated by  % 100 / )] 1 /( ) (
5 . 0 2 × − − [ t t it p n p p
it p
, where 
stands for price for city i in year t,  t p  stands for average price in year t, n is sample size (here is 31).    
  8national electricity market, the results not only do not reject the most restrictive test at the 5% level, but 
they do not reject any of the Im, Pesaran and Shin or Fisher Chi-square tests. This probably means that 
the electricity market in China is not integrated. 
4.4  Absolute versus Relative Price Convergence 
To test for absolute versus relative price convergence we make use of the significance of the 
intercept term in equation (1) in the cases where the series indicate convergence. The ‘test on the intercept 
results’ are also shown in tables 2 and 3 for coal and electricity, respectively. The highlighted stars in tables 
2 and 3 indicate that the intercept terms in equation (1) are insignificant, which implies that prices are 
convergent to absolute price parity. Otherwise, the unhighlighted stars in table 2 and 3 indicate that the 
prices converge to relative price parity. Table 2 shows that there are 13 intercept terms (highlighted) 
insignificant at or above the 5% level, accounting for 20% of the total of 65 pairs of convergent series for 
coal. In other words, among the convergent series, only 20% converge to absolute price parity and 80% 
converge to relative price parity. Similarly, for electricity there are 24 pairs, accounting for 63% of the total 
of convergent series, that suggest absolute price parity and only 37% relative price parity (table 3). In 
addition, the observed magnitudes of the significantly different from zero estimated intercept terms ( ) 
for coal and electricity price are all very small. This suggests that the price ratios of two cities are close to 
unity in terms of intercept terms. 
c
4.5  Estimated ‘half-lives’ to convergence 
Using the expression  ) 1 ln( / ) 5 . 0 ln( ij α +  and the estimated  ij α  in equation (1), we calculated 
half-lives for those relative price series that reject the null hypothesis.  The results are presented as table 5 
for coal and table 6 for electricity. The overall average rate is approximately 3.4 months, implying that it 
takes 3.4 months for coal relative prices to converge to their long-run values. The estimated half-lives vary 
little, the minimum rate is 1.4 months and the maximum is 6.2 months, and most fall in the range 2.0 to 
4.5 months. For electricity, the overall average rate is smaller, 2.2 months, implying that it takes 2.2 
months for electricity relative prices to converge to their long-run values. The estimated half-lives also 
vary little, the minimum rate is 1.2 months and the maximum is 4.2 months, and most fall in the range 2.0 
to 4.0 months. 
 
  Turning now to gasoline, table 7 reports results on the rate of convergence to long-run values. 
Here we find that 186 pairs of relative price series converge to absolute price parity, accounting for 78% 
of the total of 238 pairs of relative price series which reject the null hypothesis of non-convergence.  
  9Three cities where price convergence is well established are Jinan (code 15), Kunming (code 25) and 
Xining (code 29).  Here the results suggest that prices in these three cities converge to absolute price parity 
with more than 20 other cities. Results for Shijiazhuang (code 3), Shanghai (code 9), Changsha (code 18), 
Chengdu (code 23) and Guiyang (code 24), suggest that the relative price series are convergent to absolute 
price parity with more than half of the other cities. Turning to the convergence rate, we find that the rates 
are much faster than those of coal and electricity prices. In particular, the overall average rate is estimated 
to be 1.7 months, which is a little higher than that estimated by Fan and Wei (2006) where their estimate is 
1.3 months. The maximum rate is approximately 4.9 months, while the minimum rate is only 0.3 months 
(about ten days). Approximately 10% of the convergence rates are less one month; 60% in the range 1-2 
months and 27% between 2-3 months.       
  Table 8 presents the results for diesel. Here we find 186 pairs of relative price series that 
converge to absolute price parity, accounting for 82% of the total of 228 pairs of relative price series that 
reject the null hypothesis of non-convergence. Four cities where more than 18 relative price series 
converge to absolute price parity are Shenyang (code 6), Harbin (code 8), Nanchang (code 14) and 
Chongqing (code 22). Six cities where more than 15 relative price series converge to absolute price parity 
are Shijiazhuang (code 3), Changchun (code 7), Shanghai (code 9), Zhengzhou (code 16), Changsha (code 
18) and Xining (code 29). Furthermore, we find that convergence rates are much faster than those of coal 
and electricity prices, and even smaller than those of gasoline. In particular, the overall average rate is 1.6 
months, which is smaller than that estimated by Fan and Wei (2006) where their estimate is 2.3 months. 
The maximum rate is 2.9 months, while the minimum is only 0.6 months (about twenty days). 
Approximately 10% of the convergence rates are less than one month; 60% range from 1-2 months, and 
27% are between 2-3 months.      
4.6  Granger Causality tests 
The results for tests of Granger causality between each pair of cities where the relative prices 
significantly converge are presented as table 9 for coal and table 10 for electricity. Firstly, it can be seen 
from table 9 that there are approximately 46 pairs of bi-directional causality, accounting for nearly 54% of 
the total of 86 pairs of causal relationships for coal. However, the causal relationships vary considerably 
across cities. For example, Shanghai (code 9) and Nanning (code 20) have causally bi-directional 
relationships with 7 cities, while there are 14 cities that have no causally bi-directional relationships with 
others. Causality most likely originates from Shijiazhuang (code 3), which causes coal price change in 12 
other cities. This is followed by Beijing (code 1), Shanghai (code 9), Wuhan (code 17), Nanning (code 20) 
and Chongqing (code 22), which cause coal price changes in 6-7 other cities, respectively. Observing these 
cities (Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Shanghai and Wuhan) where causality originates, we find that almost all coal 
  10price changes originate from consumption areas rather than production areas. However, we do find that 
one of the large production bases, Huhehaote (code 5), has bi-directional causal relationship. Rather 
puzzlingly, we do not identify causality originating either from the large consumption cities, such as 
Taiyuan (code 4), Nanjing (code 10), Jinan (code 15) and Zhengzhou (code 16) or from production cities, 
such as Taiyuan (code 4), Harbin (code 8), Jinan (code 14), Zhengzhou (code 15) and Guiyang (code 24). 
Secondly, there are 65 pairs of bi-directional causality, accounting for more than 90% of the 
total of 71 pairs of causal relationships identified for electricity (table 10). The origins of causality appear 
more mixed, but it is most likely that they originate from Haikou (code 21), Nanchang (code 14) and 
Chengdu (code 23). However, there appear to be many more origins including Shijiazhuang (code 3), 
Changchun (code 7), Zhengzhou (code 16) and Changsha (code 18), that can cause electricity price change 
in 4-5 other cities. Considering the cities listed above, we find that electricity price changes may originate 
from both medium sized areas of consumption and production. It seems hard to establish that causality 
originates from both large consumption areas, such as Nanjing (code 10) and Guangdong (code 19) and 
production areas, such as Taiyuan (code 4), Hangzhou (code 11) and Jinan (code 15). 
Finally, turning to the causality results for gasoline and diesel markets. The results for these 
marlets are displayed in tables 11 and 12.  It can be seen from tables 11 and 12 that there are different 
causal scenarios from those established for gasoline and diesel because, in part, there are many more pairs 
of convergent relative price series. 
The results presented as table 11 identify 320 pairs of bi-directional causality, accounting for 
nearly 90% of the total 357 pairs where causality is established in gasoline prices. However, the causal 
relationship is richer and varies apparently across cities. For example, Shanghai (code 9), Nanchang (code 
14) and Changsha (code 18) have 18-19 bi-directional causality relationships with other cities.   
Shijiazhuang (code 3), Huhehaote (code 5), Jinan (code 15), Chengdu (code 23) and Guiyang (code 24) 
have 15-17 bi-directional causal relationships with other cities. The causality most likely originates from 
Shanghai (code 9), Nanchang (code 14) and Changsha (code 18), then Shijiazhuang (code 3), Huhehaote 
(code 5), Nanjing (code 10), Jinan (code 15), Wuhan (code 17) Haikou (code 21), Chengdu (code 23), 
Guiyang (code 24) and Yinchuan (code 30). We cannot identify whether causality originates from 
consumption cities or from production cities because most of cities in China do not produce gasoline.  
Table 12 presents the causality results for diesel. Here 409 pairs of bi-directional causality are 
established, accounting for approximately 95% of the total of 432 pairs of causal relationships identified. 
Again, the causal relationships vary across cities. For example, Shenyang (code 6), Harbin (code 8) and 
Chongqing (code 22) have over 20 bi-directional causality relationships with others cities. Taiyuan (code 
  114), Changchun (code 7), Fuzhou (code 13), Nanchang (14), Zhengzhou (code 16) and Changsha (code 18) 
have 18-19 bi-directional causality relationships with others. The causality also most likely originates from 
Shenyang (code 6), Harbin (code 8), Fuzhou (code 13) and Chongqing (code 22), then from Taiyuan (code 
4), Changchun (code 7), Nanchang (code 14), Zhengzhou (code 16), Wuhan (code 17) and Changsha 
(code 18). As with gasoline, we cannot identify whether causality originates from consumption or 
producing areas because most of the cities in China do not produce diesel. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper investigates energy market integration in China utilising a range of time series 
econometric methods and a new, high frequency energy price data set. The results presented here identify 
price series that converge to absolute or relative price parity and calculate the rates at which relative prices 
converge to their long-run values. In addition, the paper analysed ‘causal’ relationships between prices 
across cities and seeks to identify the most likely origins. In summary the major findings comprise the 
following.  
First, unit root tests show that gasoline and diesel markets are generally well integrated across 
China as most tests reject the unit root hypothesis (of non-convergence) when applied to relative prices. 
Once account is taken of some special and remote cities, it may be safe to conclude that the gasoline and 
diesel markets are well integrated as a whole. This finding is consistent with those of other authors.   
All tests suggest, however, that the electricity markets are not as well integrated in relation to 
price convergence. This may be due to commodity-specific characteristics (e.g., volume and network 
connection) or intervention (e.g., local trade barriers and central priority policies). In the case of coal, city-
by-city unit root tests suggest some regionally integrated markets. If we ignore the remote cities (due to 
transportation costs) and small regional economies which are much less likely to consume large volumes 
of coal, most cities in China might be regarded as belonging to one integrated coal market as most appear 
to ‘converge’ to each other via a network of adjacent prices. 
Secondly, we find that the estimated intercept terms are all very small and close to zero in spite 
of their significance. Therefore, the price ratios of two cities are more likely close to unity. As a result, 
most of relative price series may be regarded as convergent to absolute price parity. This is particularly 
true for oil market prices. 
Thirdly, the rates at which relative prices converge to their long-run values vary little and are 
even faster compared with that found in other countries. For example, the rate of convergence for U.S. 
coal markets ranges from more 6 months to more than 13 months (Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006). 
  12However, the rate of convergence found here for China’s coal market is, on average, only about 3.4 
months. 
Fourthly, a rich set of causality relationships appear to exist between cities. Many results 
suggest bi-directional causality, so it is hard to establish the geographic source of price changes. However, 
for coal and electricity it appears that both demand and supply cities show some impact on the source of 
the observed price changes. 
  This paper has made some important inroads into analysing and testing the degree and 
pervasiveness of energy market price integration in China by examining the time series convergence 
properties of the relative price of four major energy inputs, coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel.  Given 
previous work and a priori expectations, the results for gasoline and diesel were unsurprising, although 
their robustness utilising a new and exciting dataset were reassuring.  The results on electricity and coal, 
however, suggest more work is required to identify whether commodity specific factors or intervention are 
the source of (at best) regional market integration or regional ‘price convergence’.    
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Table 1.  Unit root tests for relative price series (Shanghai is used as a benchmark) 
Coal Electricity  Gasoline Diesel  Province City  Code 
t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.*
Beijing  Beijing  1  -2.81  0.058  -1.68 0.441 -3.14 0.025  -3.21  0.020 
Tianjin  Tianjin  2  -1.09 0.723 -1.59 0.486 -2.36 0.153 -2.87 0.050 
Hebei  Shijiazhuang  3  -3.95  0.002  -1.92 0.321 -5.21 0.000  -2.72 0.071 
Shanxi  Taiyuan  4  -1.87 0.347 -1.20 0.674 -4.29 0.001  -4.24  0.001 
Mongolia  Huhehaote  5  -3.54  0.007  -2.63  0.088  -3.99  0.002  -2.66 0.081 
Liaoning  Shenyang   6  -1.30 0.630 -1.38 0.593 -3.25 0.018  -5.12  0.000 
Jilin  Changchun  7  -1.98 0.295 -2.83 0.055  -3.58  0.007  -3.40  0.012 
Heilongjiang  Harbin  8  -2.35 0.158 -2.67 0.081  -3.63  0.006  -3.77  0.004 
Shanghai  Shanghai  9  - - - - - - - - 
Jiangsu  Nanjing  10  -1.02 0.746 -2.30 0.174 -3.20 0.021  -2.86  0.050 
Zhejiang  Hangzhou  11  -2.16 0.221 -1.97 0.298 -2.56 0.102 -2.61 0.092 
Anhui  Hefei  12  -2.05 0.266 -1.31 0.626 -3.98 0.002  -2.28 0.180 
Fujian  Fuzhou  13  -1.13 0.705 -1.77 0.393 -3.77 0.004  -3.57  0.007 
Jiangxi  Nanchang  14  -2.24 0.192 -1.57 0.497 -5.11 0.000  -3.84  0.003 
Shandong  Jinan  15  -3.70  0.004  -2.94  0.042  -3.70  0.004  -2.80 0.059 
Henan  Zhengzhou  16  -3.35  0.014  -1.53 0.518 -5.52 0.000  -3.55  0.007 
Hubei  Wuhan  17  -4.77  0.000  -1.68 0.440 -3.47 0.009  -3.36  0.013 
Hunan  Changsha  18  -2.54 0.107 -2.31 0.169 -2.82 0.056 -4.08 0.001 
Guangdong  Guangzhou  19  -2.37 0.150 -1.90 0.334 -3.81 0.003  -2.14 0.231 
Guangxi  Nanning  20  -3.57  0.007  -1.36 0.601 -2.23 0.197 -2.74 0.069 
Hainan  Haikou  21  -1.73 0.417 -3.84 0.003  -5.57  0.000  -3.38  0.012 
Chongqing  Chongqing  22  -3.44  0.010  -1.82 0.371 -2.49 0.118 -4.46 0.000 
Sichuan  Chengdu  23  -2.93  0.043  -2.46 0.127 -3.68 0.005  -2.78 0.061 
Guizhou  Guiyang  24  -1.35 0.607 -2.07 0.257 -3.86 0.003  -4.66  0.000 
Yunnan  Kunming  25  -3.09  0.028  -1.58 0.493 -3.71 0.004  -2.27 0.181 
Tibet  Lhasa  26  -0.90 0.788 -2.27 0.184 -1.88 0.343 -2.03 0.273 
Shaanxi  Xian  27  -2.58  0.099  -1.82 0.371 -3.23 0.019  -3.13  0.026 
Gansu  Lanzhou  28  -1.53 0.519 -1.76 0.399 -5.59 0.000  -3.30  0.016 
Qinghai  Xining  29  -2.51 0.114 -1.28 0.640 -4.86 0.000  -4.23  0.001 
Ningxia  Yinchuan  30  -2.57 0.100 -1.37 0.596 -4.88 0.000  -3.93  0.002 
Xinjiang  Urumqi  31  -2.26 0.186 -1.50 0.535 -3.22 0.020  -2.60 0.093 
% of rejecting null  - 9/31 - 2/31 -  25/31  -  19/31
 
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Null hypothesis is that each relative price series contains a unit root. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
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Table 2.  Unit root tests for pairs of coal relative price series for those rejecting null significant at 5% (*) and 1% (**) level (highlighted stars indicate convergent to absolute price parity and the rest to 
relative price parity) 
Code  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1   -  **  - - - - - - - - * - - - ** - - - **  - * **  - - - * - - - - 
2  -  - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3  ** -    - * ** - - ** -  - ** - -  - **  * - *  **  - * * - - - * - - - - 
4  - - -     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5  - - *     - * -  **  - - - - - * - **  ** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6 -  -  **  -  -    -  *  -  -  * - - - - - - - - **  - - - - - - * - - - - 
7  - - - - * -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8  - - - - - * -  - - - - - - - - - - - * - * - - - - - - - - - 
9  - -  **  -  ** - - -  - - - - -  **  *  ** - - **  -  **  * - * - - - - - - 
10  - - - - - - - - -  - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11  - - - - - * - - - -    - - - -  -  -  -  - ** - -  - - - - ** - * - - 
12  * -  **  - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - - **  -  **  **  - - - - - - - - 
13  - * - - - - - - - * - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
14  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - * - - * - - - - - * - - 
15  - - - - * - - -  **  - - - - -   - *  ** - - - - - - * - - - - - - 
16 **  -  **  - - - -  - * - - - -  - -  **  - - - -  ** - - - - - - - - - 
17  - - * -  ** - - -  **  - - - - - * **    **  * * - * - - - - - - - - - 
18  - - - -  ** - - - - - - - - -  ** - **   - - - * - - - - - - - - - 
19  - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - * -   **  - - - - - - * - - - - 
20  ** - ** -  - ** - * ** - ** ** - *  -  -  *  - **    -  * * - - - * - - - - 
21  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - * - - - 
22 *  -  * - -  - - *  **  - - **  - - - ** *  * - *  -  *  -  -  - -  - -  - 
23 **  - *  - - - -  - * - - **  - * - - - - - * - *   - - - - - - - - 
24  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - 
25  - - - - - - - - * - - - - - * - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - 
26  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - 
27  * - * - - * - - - -  ** - - - - - - - * * - - - - - -    -  **    
28  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - -  - - - 
29  - - - - - - - - - - * - - * - - - - - - - - - - - -  **  -  - - 
30  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
31  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
  
Table 3.  Unit root tests for pairs of electricity relative price series for those rejecting null significant at 5% (*) and 1% (**) level (highlighted stars indicate convergent to absolute price parity and 
the rest to relative price parity) 
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  21  22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3  - -  -  **  - - - - - - - - - - * - * - - - -  **  - - - - - - - - 
4  - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - 
5  - -  **  -  - - - - * - - - * - * - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - 
7  - - - - - -  - - - - - - * - * - * - -  **  - - - - - - - - - - 
8  - - - - - - -  - - - - - - * - - - - -  **  - - - - - - - - - - 
9  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - * - - - - -  **  - - - - - - - - - - 
10  - - - - * - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - 
12  - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
13  - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - 
14  - - - - * - * - - - - - -  - - - * - -  **  -  ** -  - **  - - - - - 
15  - - - - - - - *  * - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
16 -  -  * -  **  - * - - - - - - - -  - - - -  **  -  **  - - * - - - - - 
17 -  * - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - * * - - - 
18 -  -  ** -  * - * - - - - - - * - - -  - - - - * - - - - - - - - 
19  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
20  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - 
21  - - - - - -  **  **  ** -  -  -  - ** - ** -  -  -  -    * - - -  **  - - - - - 
22  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *  * - - - - - - - - 
23 -  -  **  - - - - - - - - - -  ** - ** -  * - - - *  - - * - - - - - 
24  - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - -  - - *  * - - - 
25  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - 
26  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  **  - * - - - -  ** -  * - -  - - - - - 
27  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - * - -  **  - - - 
28  - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - * - - - - - - * - -  **  - - - 
29  - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
30  - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
31  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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Table 4. Panel data unit root tests for identified regional or national markets (group average is used as a benchmark) 
Regional   
coal  
market  I 
Regional  
coal  
market  II 
Regional  
coal  
market  III 
National 
gasoline market 





Panel unit root tests 
(assumption) 
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
Im, Pesaran and Shin  -4.5  0.00  -4.7  0.00 -5.7 0.00  -14.2  0.00 -8.3 0.00 -0.8 0.21 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  61.0  0.00  66.1 0.00 97.4 0.00 359 0.00 205 0.00 60.2 0.54 
 
Note: Exogenous variables are individual effects and linear trend and null hypothesis is unit root (individual unit root process).  Regional coal 
market I includes cities 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 16, 17, 22, 23 and 27; Regional coal market II includes cities 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 and 27; 
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Table 5.  The estimated half-lives for coal (months) for those rejecting null hypothesis (unit root) at 5% and 1% significant level 
Code  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1    - 3.6  - - - - - - - -  3.1  - - -  3.3 - - -  2.2 -  4.4 3.0 - - -  5.3 - - -  - 
2  -    - - - - - - - - - -  3.5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
3  3.6  -    - 3.1  3.7 -  - 2.1 -  - 2.8 -  -  - 3.4 4.3 - 3.2 1.7 - 5.6 5.3 -  -  - 4.9 -  -  - - 
4  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
5  -  - 3.1  -    -  3.2  -  1.9  - - - - -  3.0  -  1.9 2.1  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6  -  -  3.7 -  -    - 2.1 -  - 5.2 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 1.7 -  -  -  -  -  - 4.2 -  -  - - 
7  -  -  - -  3.2  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
8  -  -  - - -  2.1  -  - - - - - - - - - - -  2.8 -  5.9 - - - - - - - -  - 
9  -  -  2.1 - 1.9 -  -  -    -  -  -  -  - 1.8  2.3 1.4 -  - 2.2 - 2.8 3.6 - 2.6 -  -  -  -  - - 
10  -  -  - - - - - - -  - -  3.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
11  -  -  - - -  5.2  - - - -  - - - - - - - -  1.9 - - - - - -  1.8 -  2.5 -  - 
12 3.1 - 2.8  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - -  2.0 -  3.5 3.1 - - - - - - -  - 
13  - 3.5 - - - - - - -  3.1 - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
14  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  2.6 - -  3.9 - - - - -  3.1 -  - 
15  -  -  - -  3.0  - - -  1.8  - - - - -    -  6.2 3.7  - - - - - -  5.0 - - - - - - 
16 3.3 - 3.4  - - - - -  2.3  - - - - - -   4.0 - - - -  4.3 - - - - - - - -  - 
17  -  -  4.3 - 1.9 -  -  - 1.4 -  -  -  -  - 6.2  4.0  4.2  3.2 3.8 - 4.9 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - 
18  -  -  - -  2.1  - - - - - - - - -  3.7  -  4.2  - - -  5.5 - - - - - - - -  - 
19  -  - 3.2  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  3.2 -   2.8 - - - - - -  4.6 - - -  - 
20  2.2  -  1.7 -  - 1.7 - 2.8  2.2 - 1.9  2.0 - 2.6 -  - 3.8 - 2.8   - 4.4 3.4 -  -  - 2.6 -  -  - - 
21  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  3.1 - -  - 
22  4.4  -  5.6 -  -  -  - 5.9  2.8 -  - 3.5 -  -  - 4.3 4.9 5.5 - 4.4 -   4.3 -  -  -  -  -  -  - - 
23  3.0  -  5.3 -  -  -  -  - 3.6 -  - 3.1 - 3.9 -  -  -  -  - 3.4 - 4.3   -  -  -  -  -  -  - - 
24  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - 
25  -  -  - - - - - -  2.6  - - - - -  5.0  - - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - 
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - -  - 
27 5.3 - 4.9  - -  4.2  - - - -  1.8  - - - - - - -  4.6 2.6 - - - - - -  -  2.0 -  - 
28  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  3.1 - - - - - -  - -  - 
29  -  -  - - - - - - - -  2.5  - -  3.1  - - - - - - - - - - - -  2.0 -  -  - 
30  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
31  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
  20 
Table 6.  The estimated half-lives for electricity (months) for those rejecting null hypothesis (unit root) at 5% and 1% significant level 
Code  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1    -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2  -    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  2.3 - -  - - - - - - -  - - - - 
3  -  -   -  2.2  - - - - - - - - - -  2.4  -  2.5  -  - - -  1.3 - - - - - - - - 
4  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  1.2 - - 
5  -  - 2.2  -    - - - -  4.2 - - -  2.4 -  2.3  -  2.4  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6  -  -  - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  3.1 - 
7  -  -  - - - -  - - - - - -  1.5 -  1.9  -  2.3  -  -  1.3 - - - - - - - - - - 
8  -  -  - - - - -    - - - - - -  2.9  - - - - -  1.8 - - - - - - - - - - 
9  -  -  - - - - - -    - - - - -  3.0  - - - - -  1.6 - - - - - - - - - - 
10  -  -  - -  4.2  - - - -    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11  -  -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  1.6 - - - 
12  -  -  - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
13  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - -  3.1 - - - - - - - 
14  -  -   -  2.4  -  1.5  - - - - - -  - - -  4.0  -  -  1.5 -  1.7 - -  1.7  - - - - - 
15  -  -  - - - - -  2.9  3.0  - - - - -    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
16  -  - 2.4  -  2.3  -  1.9  - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  2.2   1.8 - -  2.7  - - - - - 
17  - 2.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - -  - - - - - - -  2.5 1.5 - - - 
18  -  - 2.5  -  2.4  -  2.3  - - - - - -  4.0 -    -  - - - -  1.9 - - - - - - - - 
19  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
20  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - 
21  -  -  - - - -  1.3  1.8  1.6  - - - -  1.5 -  2.2  - - - -   2.5 - - -  1.9  - - - - - 
22  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - -  -  2.5   2.4 - - - - - - - - 
23  -  - 1.3  - - - - - - - - - -  1.7 -  1.8  -  1.9  -  - -  2.4  - -  2.2  - - - - - 
24  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  3.1  - - - - - -  - - - -  - -  2.9 3.0 - - - 
25  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - 
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - -  1.7 -  2.7  - - -  -  1.9 -  2.2 - -  - - - - - 
27  -    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  2.5 - -  - - - -  2.9 - -   1.3 - - - 
28  -  -  - - - - - - - -  1.6  - - - - -  1.5 - -  - - - -  3.0 - -  1.3  - - - 
29  -  -  -  1.2  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  - - 
30  -  -  - - -  3.1  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - 
31  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -  
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Table 7.  The estimated half-lives for gasoline (month) for those rejecting null  significant at above 5% level (all numbers in this table are significant at above 5% level, the highlighted converge to absolute price 
parity and the rest to relative price parity) 
Code  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
1    -  1.2  2.9  1.8 -  - 1.2  2.1 -  -  -  - 2.2 -  -  - 2.5 -  - 1.2 - 2.3 2.8 1.7 - 1.4 2.3 1.1 2.0 - 
2  -    -  2.8  -  1.9  1.0  - -  2.5 - - - - - - -  2.4  - - -  1.4 -  2.5 2.2 -  -  1.6 - - 
3  1.2  -   1.8  1.1 -  - 1.0  1.1  2.3 - 1.8 - 1.5  2.9  1.1 1.1 1.4 -  - 1.1 - 1.9 2.1 1.7 - 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.2
4 2.9  2.8  1.8   - - - -  1.7  0.7 -  1.4  2.7 1.7  2.0  - -  1.5  - - - - -  2.0 1.9 - - -  1.2 - - 
5  1.8 - 1.1 -   1.8 - 0.7  1.7 -  -  - 1.5 1.6  2.9  0.8 0.7 1.8 -  - 1.5 - 2.0 2.2 1.7 - 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 - 
6 -  1.9  -  - 1.8  1.1 - 1.6 -  -  -  - 1.3  2.9 -  -  -  -  -  - 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.7 -  - 1.6 1.2 -  - 
7 -  1.0 - - -  1.1   -  1.1  1.5 - - -  1.0  -  1.3 - - - - -  0.9 2.0 1.2 1.9 - - -  1.3 - - 
8  1.2 - 1.0 - 0.7  - -   1.3  - - -  1.0 - -  0.8 1.3 1.7  - -  1.2 - - -  1.7 - - -  1.1  - 
9  2.1 - 1.1 1.7 1.7  1.6 1.1 1.3  2.1 - 1.6  2.0 1.2 2.9 0.8 1.6 -  2.4 -  0.9 -  2.0 2.0 2.1 -  0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.7
10 -  2.5 2.3  0.7 -  - 1.5 - 2.1  1.6 -  - 1.6  2.1 -  - 1.9  1.6 1.4 -  -  - 1.6 2.0 -  -  - 1.2 2.5 - 
11  -  -  - - - - - - -  1.6   - - -  2.1  - - -  0.9 0.8 - - -  3.1 - - - -  1.4 - - 
12 - -  1.8  1.4  - - - -  1.6  - -    - -  3.0  -  1.9 1.3  2.9 - - - - -  2.0 -  1.7 -  1.4 2.1 - 
13 - - -  2.7  1.5 -  - 1.0  2.0  - - -    - - -  1.5 2.4  - - - - - -  1.7 - - -  1.0 1.5 - 
14  2.2 - 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.3  1.0  -  1.2  1.6 - - -   2.6  0.9 1.3 1.8  - -  1.4 -  1.8 1.6 1.9 -  0.9 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.5
15 - -  2.9  2.0  2.9  2.9 -  - 2.9  2.1 2.1  3.0 - 2.6  2.8 3.1 2.7  1.5 1.9 3.4 3.2 2.3 -  1.8 - 2.9 3.2 1.0 2.9 - 
16 - -  1.1 - 0.8 - 1.3  0.8  0.8  - - - -  0.9  2.8   0.6 0.8  - -  0.9 - - -  1.9 -  0.5 0.5 1.1 0.5 - 
17 - -  1.1 - 0.7 -  - 1.3  1.6 -  - 1.9  1.5 1.3  3.1  0.6  1.4 -  - 1.7 - 2.3 2.5 1.8 - 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 - 
18  2.5  2.4  1.4 1.5 1.8 -  - 1.7 - 1.9 - 1.3  2.4 1.8  2.7  0.8 1.4   2.3 - - -  2.5 2.2 2.2 -  4.9 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.9
19  -  -  - - - - - -  2.4  1.6 0.9  2.9 -  - 1.5 -  - 2.3    1.0 - - - - - - - -  1.5 - - 
20  -  -  - - - - - - -  1.4 0.8  - - -  1.9  - - -  1.0  - - - -  2.2 - - -  1.3 - - 
21  1.2 - 1.1  -  1.5 -  - 1.2  0.9  - - - -  1.4  3.4  0.9 1.7 - - -  -  2.1 2.5 1.9 - - -  1.2 1.5 1.2
22 -  1.4 - - -  1.1  0.9  - - - - - - -  3.2  - - - - - -   2.4 1.6 2.0 - - -  1.3 - - 
23  2.3 - 1.9 - 2.0  1.4  2.0 - 2.0  - - - -  1.8  2.3 - 2.3 2.5 -  - 2.1 2.4  -  1.7 3.8  1.4 2.1 1.0 2.6 2.5
24  2.8  2.5  2.1 2.0 2.2  1.2  1.2 - 2.0 1.6 3.1 -  - 1.6 -  - 2.5 2.2 -  - 2.5 1.6 -   1.8 2.8  1.7 1.9 1.1 2.5 2.4
25  1.7  2.2  1.7  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.9  1.7  2.1 2.0 -  2.0  1.7 1.9  1.8  1.9 1.8 2.2 - 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.8  2.0  1.9 1.8 0.3 1.8 1.7
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  3.8 2.8 2.0   - -  1.3 - - 
27  1.4 - 0.6 - 1.0 -  -  - 0.9 -  - 1.7 - 0.9  2.9  0.5 0.9 4.9  - - - -  1.4 1.7 1.9 -   0.5 1.1 0.6 1.1
28  2.3 - 1.0 - 1.1  1.6   -  1.1  - - - -  1.1  3.2  0.5 1.0 1.4  - - - -  2.1 1.9 1.8 -  0.5  1.1 1.1 - 
29  1.1  1.6  1.1  1.2 1.0 1.2  1.3  1.1  1.3 1.2 1.4  1.4 1.0 1.2  1.0  1.1 1.1 1.3  1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.3 1.3  1.1 1.1  1.1 1.1
30  2.0 - 0.6 - 0.9 -  -  - 1.2 2.5 -  2.1 1.5 1.7  2.9  0.5 1.0 1.4 -  - 1.5 -  2.6 2.5 1.8 -  0.6 1.1 1.1  - 
31  -  - 1.2  - - - - -  1.7  - - - -  1.5  - - -  1.9  - -  1.2 -  2.5 2.4 1.7 -  1.1 -  1.1 -  
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Table 8.  The estimated half-lives for diesel (month) for those rejecting null  significant at above 5% level (all numbers in this table are significant at above 5% level, the highlighted converge to absolute price parity 
and the rest to relative price parity) 
Code  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
1    -  1.8 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.1 1.3 2.5  -  -  -  1.2 -  -  1.5 2.3 -  -  -  -  2.8 1.2 1.3 1.3 -  -  -  1.4 1.1 - 
2  -    - - - -  0.7  -  1.9  1.3 1.7  -  2.5 - -  2.0 -  1.4  1.3 - -  1.8 - - - -  1.7 - - - - 
3  1.8 -    2.0  1.8  1.4  1.2  0.8  - - - -  2.1 - -  1.5 2.4 - - - -  2.5 1.4 0.7 - -  1.5 0.9 1.3 0.7 1.4
4  2.0 - 2.0    -  1.0 1.1  -  1.3 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.7 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 -  -  1.3 2.1 1.6 -  -  0.8 1.5 -  1.5 - 
5  2.5 - 1.8 -   2.3 - 1.5 -  -  -  - 1.5 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 2.7 2.2 2.9 -  -  - 2.1 2.3 -  - 
6  1.9 - 1.4 1.0 2.3    1.1 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.9  -  1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2  -  -  -  1.8 1.6 1.3 1.8 -  1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 - 
7  2.1  0.7  1.2  1.1 - 1.1    0.9 1.2 1.5 -  -  1.9 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.4  -  -  -  1.7 1.9 1.0 -  -  1.1 1.0 -  -  - 
8  1.3 - 0.8 - 1.5  1.3  0.9    1.7  -  -  2.0 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.6 2.0  -  -  2.1 2.6 1.2 0.7 1.1 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.5
9  2.5  1.9 -  1.3  -  1.2  1.2  1.7   -  -  - 2.3 1.5 - 0.9 1.5 1.1 -  - 1.4 1.8 - 1.2 -  - 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.4 - 
10  - 1.3 -  1.0  -  1.7  1.5  - -   1.3  - -  1.6  - - -  1.6  1.2 1.8 -  1.5 - - - - - - - - - 
11 -  1.7 -  1.5  -  1.9  - - -  1.3   - - -  2.9  - - -  1.2 1.0 -  2.0 - - - -  2.2 - - - - 
12 - - -  1.3  - - -  2.0  - - -    -  1.1  - - - - - -  0.9 1.4 - - - - - - - - - 
13 1.2  2.5  2.1 1.7 1.5  1.4  1.9  1.3  2.3  - - -  - -  1.7 1.6 - - -  1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 2.0 2.7  - -  1.9 1.2 2.7
14 - - -  0.9 - 1.4  1.3  1.6  1.5  1.6 -  1.1 -    - 1.1 1.2 1.7  2.1 2.7 1.1 1.6 - 1.6 -  - 1.0 - 1.5 1.6 2.5
15 - - -  1.5 - 1.5  1.7  1.7 -  - 2.9  - - -  -  2.5 2.6  -  -  -  1.9 1.6 1.8 - -  1.4 -  1.2 1.0 - 
16  1.5  2.0  1.5 1.1  -  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.9 -  -  - 1.7 1.1  -    0.6 1.5  - - -  1.2 -  0.7 - -  0.9 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.9
17  2.3 - 2.4  1.0 - 1.3  1.2 1.6 1.5 -  -  - 1.6 1.2  2.5  0.6  1.9 -  - 1.2 1.5 - 1.3 -  - 0.8 2.0 - 1.0 - 
18 -  1.4 -  1.5 - 1.2  1.4  2.0 1.1 1.6 -  -  -  1.7  2.6  1.5 1.9  1.6 1.6 1.1 1.9 2.8 1.6 -  - 1.5 2.4 1.6 2.0 - 
19 -  1.3 -  1.8  - - - - -  1.2 1.2 -  - 2.1 -  -  - 1.6    1.0 -  2.6 - - - - - - - - - 
20  -  -  - - - - - - -  1.8 1.0 -  - 2.7 -  -  - 1.6  1.0  -  2.4 - - - - - - - - - 
21  -  -  - - - - -  2.1  1.4 -  - 0.9  1.8 1.1 -  - 1.2 1.1  - -   1.3 -  2.1 - - - - - - - 
22  2.8  1.8  2.5  1.3 2.7 1.8  1.7  2.6  1.8 1.5 2.0  1.4 1.8 1.6  1.9  1.2 1.5 1.9  2.6 2.4 1.3  2.3 1.6 1.9 - 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.8 2.7
23  1.2 - 1.4  2.1  2.2  1.6  1.9  1.2  - - - -  1.7 -  1.6 -  - 2.8  - - -  2.3  - - - -  1.7 1.5 1.2 - 
24  1.3 - 0.7 1.6 2.9  1.3  1.0  0.7  1.2 -  -  - 1.4 1.6  1.8  0.7 1.3 1.6 -  - 2.1 1.6 -  - - - - - - - 
25 1.3 -  - - -  1.8 - 1.1  - - - - -  2.3  - - - - - - -  1.9 - -   - - - - - - 
26  -  -  - - - - -  2.0  - - - -  2.7 - - - - - - - - - - - -    -  2.2 - - - 
27 -  1.7  1.5 0.8  -  1.0  1.1 1.0 1.4 - 2.2 -  - 1.0  1.4  0.9 0.8 1.5  - - -  1.4 - - - -    1.0 0.7 0.8 - 
28 - -  0.9 1.5 2.1  1.3 1.0 0.7  2.0  - - - - - -  1.1 2.0 2.4  - - -  2.0 1.7 - -  2.2  1.0  1.2 0.9 1.6
29  1.4 - 1.3 - 2.3  1.1 - 1.1  1.2 -  -  - 1.9 1.5  1.2  1.5 -  1.6  - - -  1.4 1.5 - - -  0.7 1.2  0.9 - 
30  1.1 - 0.7 1.5  -  0.9 - 0.8  1.4 -  -  - 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0  - - -  1.8 1.2 - - -  0.8 0.9 0.9  - 
31  -  - 1.4  - - - -  1.5  - - - -  2.7 2.5 - 1.9 - - - - -  2.7 - - - - -  1.6 - -  
  23 
Table 9. Causality among coal price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column) 
Code  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 18  19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26  27 28 29 30 31
1    -  - - - - - - - - -  → -  -  - → -  -  - ↔ -  ↔ → - - - ↔ - - - - 
2  -    - - - - - - - - - -  → -  -    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3  → -    -  →  → -  - ↔ -  - ↔ -  -  - ↔  → -  ↔  ↔ -  → → - - - → - - - - 
4  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
5  - - -  -  -  ↔ - ↔ -  -  -  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6  - - -  -  -  -  → -  - →  - - - - - -  -  -  → - - - - - - → - - - - 
7  - - -  -  ↔ -      -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8  -  -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  -  -  → - - - - - - - - - - - 
9 -  -  ↔ - ↔  - - -  - - - - -  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔ - -  ↔ -  ↔ - - - - - - 
10  -  -  - - - - - - -  - -  → -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11  -  -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  -  -  ↔ - - - - - - ↔ -  → - - 
12 - -  ↔  - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  -  -  → - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - 
13  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
14  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - -  - - -  -  -  ↔ - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - 
15 - - -  -  → -  -  - ↔  - - - - -  - -  →  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
16 - -  ↔  - - - - -  ↔  - - - - - -   -  - - -  - - - - - - - - - 
17 - - -  -  → -  -  - →  - - - - -  →  →  →  →  → -  → - - - - - - - - - 
18 - - -  -  →  - - - - - - - - - - - -    -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
19 - -  ↔  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -   ↔ - -  - - - → - - - - 
20  ↔ - ↔  - -  - -  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ -  -  - -  ↔   - - ↔ - - - - - - - - 
21  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  → - - - 
22  ↔ -  - - - - -  →  → -  - → -  -  -    -  → - → -  - - - - - - - - - 
23  -  -  - - - - - -  ↔ -  - ↔ - ↔ -  -  - - -  ↔ -  →  - - - - - - - - 
24  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
25  -  -  - - - - - -  ↔  - - - - -  → - -  - - - - - -   - - - - - - 
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
27  ↔ -  - - - - - - - -  ↔  - - - - - -  -  -  → - - - - - -   -  ↔ - - 
28  -  -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  - 
29  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - -  ↔ -  - - 
30  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  - 
31  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  
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Table 10. Causality among electricity price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column) 
Code  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 18  19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26  27 28 29 30 31
1    -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
2  -    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3 -  -   -  →  - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - ↔  - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - 
4  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  → - - 
5  -  -  - -  - - - -  ↔  - - - - -  ↔ - ↔  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6  -  -  - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  ↔ - 
7  -  -  - - - -  - - - - - -  ↔ - ↔ - ↔ -  - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - 
8  -  -  - - - - -    - - - - -  ↔ - - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - - - 
9  -  -  - - - - - -  - - - - -  ↔ - - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - - - 
10 - - -  -  ↔ -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11  -  -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  ↔ - - - 
12  -  -  - - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
13  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  ↔ - - - - - - - 
14 - - -  -  → - ↔  - - - - - -  - - -  ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - 
15  -  -  - - - - -  ↔  ↔ -  -  -  -  -    - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - 
16 - -  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  ↔ -  ↔ - - - - - - - - 
17 -  ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - -  ↔ ↔ - - - 
18 - -  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  - - - - - -  ↔ -  - -  - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - 
19  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
20  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  - 
21 - - -  -  -  -  ↔  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔ - ↔  - - - -  ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - - 
22  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  ↔   ↔ - - - - - - - - 
23 - -  ↔  - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - ↔ - ↔ -  -  - ↔  - -  ↔ - - - - - 
24  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ -  -  - - - - - - - -  - - → ↔ - - - 
25  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -  -  - 
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - →  - - - -  ↔ -  ↔ - -    - - - - - 
27  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - - -   - - - - 
28  -  -  - - - - - - - -  ↔  - - - - -  ↔ - - - - - -  ↔ - -  →  - - - 
29  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  - 
30 - - -  -  -  ↔  - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  - 
31  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - - -  -  -  -  
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Table 11. Causality among gasoline price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column) 
Code  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 18  19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26  27 28 29 30 31
1   -  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  - - - -  ↔ -  - - - - -  ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ - - - - 
2 -  -  ↔ - ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  - - - - - - -  ↔ -  -  - ↔ -  → → - - - - - - 
3  ↔ -   ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ - - -  →
4  ↔  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  ↔  - - - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - 
5  ↔ - ↔ -   ↔ - ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ - 
6 -  ↔ - -  ↔  ↔ - ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔ - - - - - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ → -   ↔ - - - 
7 -  ↔ - - -  ↔   - ↔  ↔  - - -  ↔ - ↔  - - - - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ → - - - - - - 
8  → - ↔ - ↔ -     ↔ -  -  - ↔ -  - ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - 
9  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  →  ↔  ↔ -  ↔ - ↔ -   ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ ↔
10 -  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ - →  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔ -  -  ↔  ↔  ↔ - - -  ↔ - - - - -  ↔ - 
11  -  -  - - - - - - -  ↔   - - - → -  - -  ↔  ↔ - - -  ↔ - - - - - - - 
12 - -  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔  - -  - -  → - ↔ ↔  ↔  - - - - - - - ↔ - -  ↔ - 
13 - - -  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  - - -  - - -  ↔ ↔  - - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - 
14  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ ↔
15 - -  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ -  ↔ - 
16 - -  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔   -  ↔ -  - ↔ - - - - - ↔ ↔ -  ↔ - 
17 - -  ↔ - ↔ -  - ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - -  → ↔ -  ↔ - 
18  →  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔   ↔ -  -  - ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ ↔
19  -  -  - - - - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ -  -  ↔  ↔ - - - -   - - - - - - 
20  -  -  - - - - - - -  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔ -  - -  ↔  - - - - - - - - - - - 
21  ↔ - ↔ - ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - - -  -  ↔ ↔ - - - - -  ↔ ↔
22 -  ↔ - - -  ↔  ↔  - - - - - -  →     - - -   ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - 
23  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔ - →  - - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ ↔  - -  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ ↔
24  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ -   ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ ↔ -  -  →  → - -  → →
25  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  → - →  - - - - - -  ↔ - - ↔ - - 
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -  -  ↔ ↔ -  -  -  -  -  - 
27  → - ↔ - ↔ -  -  - ↔ -  - ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  - - - -  ↔ → - -   - - -  ↔
28  → - → - ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔  - - - -  ↔ → - -  →  -  ↔ - 
29 - - -  -  -  -  →  - - - - - - - - - -  →  →  - - - - -  ↔ - - -  - - 
30  → - → - ↔ -  -  - →  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  → ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ → - -  → ↔ -  - 
31 - -  ↔  - - - - -  →  - - - -  ↔ -  -  -  ↔ -  - ↔ -  ↔ → - -  ↔  - -  
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Table 12. Causality among diesel price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column) 
Code  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 18  19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26  27 28 29 30 31
1   -  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔ -  - ↔  - - - - - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ - - -  ↔ ↔ - 
2  -    - - - -  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ -  - ↔ - ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - 
3  ↔ -   → - ↔  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔ -  - ↔  - - - - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
4  ↔ -  -    -  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔   - - ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ - 
5  ↔ - → -   → - ↔  - - - -  ↔  - - - -  -  -  -  -  ↔ → ↔ - - -  ↔ ↔ - - 
6  ↔ - ↔  ↔    ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ -  -  - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ -  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - 
7  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔  - - - -  ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ - - - 
8  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ →  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
9  ↔  ↔ -  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ ↔ -  ↔ - -  ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - 
10 -  ↔ -  ↔ - ↔  ↔ -  -   ↔ -  - ↔ -  -  -  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  ↔ - - - - - - - - - 
11 -  ↔ -  ↔ - ↔ -  -  - ↔   - - - ↔ -  - -  ↔  ↔ -  ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - 
12 - - -  ↔  - - -  ↔  - - -  -  ↔ -  - - - - -  ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - - - 
13  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  →  - - -  - -  ↔  ↔ - - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔
14 - - -  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ -    - ↔  ↔ ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ ↔ -  ↔  -  ↔ -  ↔ ↔ ↔
15 - - -  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔   - ↔  - - -  -  ↔ ↔   - - - ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - 
16  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  ↔ -   ↔ ↔ -  -  - ↔ -  ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
17  → - →  → - →  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  → -  - → ↔ -  ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ -  → - 
18 -  ↔ -  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  - - -  ↔  ↔  ↔ -   ↔  ↔ ↔ -  ↔ ↔ - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - 
19 -  ↔ -  ↔  - - - - -  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ -  -  -  ↔  ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - 
20  -  -  -  - - - - -  ↔  ↔ -  - ↔ -  -  -  ↔  ↔   - ↔ - - - - - - - - - 
21  -  -  - - - - -  ↔  ↔ -   ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  -  ↔ -  -   ↔ -  ↔ - - - - - - - 
22  →  ↔  ↔  →  ↔  ↔  →  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  →  ↔  ↔ →  →  ↔ ↔   ↔ → ↔ -  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ →
23  ↔ - ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  - - - -  ↔ - ↔ -  -  ↔ -  -  - ↔  - - - -  ↔ ↔ ↔ - 
24  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  - ↔ - -  - - - - - - - 
25  ↔ -  - - -  ↔ - ↔  - - - -  ↔  - - - -  -  -  -  -  ↔ - -   - - - - - - 
26  -  -  - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ -  -  - - - - - - - - - -    - - - - - 
27 -  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  -  - ↔ - - - -   ↔ ↔ ↔ - 
28 - -  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔  →  - - - - - -  ↔  ↔ ↔ -  -  - ↔ ↔ - - →  ↔   ↔ ↔ ↔
29  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔ - ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ -  -  - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔   ↔ - 
30  ↔ - ↔  ↔ - ↔ - ↔  ↔ -  -  - ↔  ↔  ↔  ↔ - ↔ -  -  - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔  - 
31 - -  ↔  - - - -  ↔  - - - -  ↔  ↔ - ↔  - - - - - - - - - - -  ↔ - -  
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Appendix 1. Unit root tests for raw price series (level) 
Coal Electricity  Gasoline Diesel  City Code
t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* 
Beijing  1  -0.71 0.841 -0.85 0.803 0.23 0.974 -0.64 0.859 
Tianjin  2  -2.51 0.114 -0.38 0.909 0.30 0.978 -0.30 0.922 
Shijiazhuang  3  -0.91 0.785 -1.55 0.506 0.43 0.984 -0.70 0.844 
Taiyuan  4  -0.38 0.909 -0.19 0.937 -0.01 0.956 -0.50 0.889 
Huhehaote  5  0.01 0.958 -2.15 0.224 0.19 0.972 -0.66 0.854 
Shenyang  6  -1.15 0.697 -1.27 0.643 0.17 0.970 -0.82 0.812 
Changchun  7  -0.47 0.894 -1.71 0.426 -0.20 0.935 -0.71 0.842 
Harbin  8  -1.15 0.696 -1.79 0.387 0.23 0.974 -0.96 0.767 
Shanghai  9  -0.99 0.757 -1.89 0.335 -0.03 0.955 -0.47 0.893 
Nanjing  10  -2.28 0.180 -1.68 0.442 0.15 0.969 -0.57 0.873 
Hangzhou  11  -0.70 0.845 -2.66 0.082 0.28 0.977 -0.35 0.914 
Hefei  12  -0.23 0.932 -0.17 0.940 0.61 0.990 -0.11 0.946 
Fuzhou  13  -2.63 0.088 -1.94 0.313 0.15 0.969 -0.73 0.835 
Nanchang  14  -1.32 0.623 -1.97 0.300 0.10 0.966 -0.04 0.954 
Jinan  15  -0.20 0.936 -1.83 0.364 0.09 0.965 -0.38 0.910 
Zhengzhou  16  0.14 0.969 -1.98 0.295 0.19 0.972 -0.12 0.945 
Wuhan  17  -0.01 0.956 -1.22 0.667 0.70 0.992 -0.22 0.933 
Changsha  18  0.54 0.988 -1.72 0.420 0.13 0.968 -0.64 0.858 
Guangzhou  19  -0.27 0.926 -1.96 0.305 0.21 0.973 -0.67 0.851 
Nanning  20  -0.80 0.818 -1.23 0.664 0.29 0.977 -0.49 0.891 
Haikou  21  -1.73 0.416 -1.75 0.407 0.23 0.974 -0.72 0.840 
Chongqing  22  -1.60 0.482 -2.03 0.273 0.29 0.978 -0.10 0.947 
Chengdu  23  -0.70 0.845 -1.49 0.538 -0.21 0.935 -0.27 0.927 
Guiyang  24  -1.54 0.510 -2.40 0.142 -0.02 0.955 -0.53 0.881 
Kunming  25  -0.56 0.877 -0.72 0.839 -3.85 0.083 -0.92 0.782 
Lhasa  26  -  -  -1.89 0.335 -0.36 0.912 -1.28 0.640 
Xian  27  -2.14 0.229 -2.98 0.088 0.21 0.973 -0.71 0.842 
Lanzhou  28  -2.06 0.260 -2.28 0.180 0.61 0.990 -0.42 0.903 
Xining  29  0.24 0.975 -0.58 0.872 -4.73 0.070 0.12 0.967 
Yinchuan  30  0.53 0.988 -0.84 0.808 0.42 0.984 -0.62 0.863 
Urumqi  31  -2.14 0.229 -2.21 0.202 0.38 0.982 -0.53 0.882 
 
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Note: Null hypothesis is that each series contains a unit root; ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; 






  Appendix 2. Unit root tests for coal and electricity raw price series (first 
difference) 
Coal Electricity  City Code 
t-stat. Prob.* t-stat.  Prob.* 
Beijing  1  -4.93 0.000  -29.65  0.000 
Tianjin  2  -19.77 0.000  -32.86  0.000 
Shijiazhuang  3  -14.06 0.000  -9.83  0.000 
Taiyuan  4  -22.06 0.000  -33.22  0.000 
Huhehaote  5  -9.20 0.000  -30.45  0.000 
Shenyang  6  -11.37 0.000  -11.13  0.000 
Changchun  7  -4.52 0.000  -33.52  0.000 
Harbin  8  -21.36 0.000  -27.74  0.000 
Shanghai  9  -21.06 0.000  -31.29  0.000 
Nanjing  10  -20.89 0.000  -29.63  0.000 
Hangzhou  11  -5.70 0.000  -30.50  0.000 
Hefei  12  -18.47 0.000  -33.14  0.000 
Fuzhou  13  -10.03 0.000  -32.61  0.000 
Nanchang  14  -23.39 0.000  -11.51  0.000 
Jinan  15  -5.53 0.000  -27.18  0.000 
Zhengzhou  16  -19.86 0.000  -6.98  0.000 
Wuhan  17  -8.10 0.000  -28.84  0.000 
Changsha  18  -12.11 0.000  -23.62  0.000 
Guangzhou  19  -19.44 0.000  -29.34  0.000 
Nanning  20  -20.47 0.000  -26.90  0.000 
Haikou  21  -10.93 0.000  -32.77  0.000 
Chongqing  22  -7.88 0.000  -10.91  0.000 
Chengdu  23  -6.93 0.000  -32.20  0.000 
Guiyang  24  -6.73 0.000  -28.91  0.000 
Kunming  25  -14.13 0.000  -26.04  0.000 
Lhasa  26  - -  -11.28  0.000 
Xian  27  -26.18 0.000  -34.10  0.000 
Lanzhou  28  -6.66 0.000  -30.67  0.000 
Xining  29  -19.20 0.000  -35.04  0.000 
Yinchuan  30  -8.13 0.000  -21.56  0.000 
Urumqi  31  -27.73 0.000  -31.08  0.000 
 
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Note: Null hypothesis is that each series contains a unit root; ADF is the Augmented 
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